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Abstract
The Iraqi media landscape has been char-
acterised by partisan ownership, mainly 
based on political and religious affiliations. 
Comparative ethnographic research has 
revealed highly irregular practices and the 
struggles of Iraqi journalists to adhere to 
the norms of professionalism, suggesting 
that these practices are contributing to and 
fuelling the ongoing context of conflict 
and violence in Iraq. Within this challeng-
ing environment, there have been some 
attempts to develop media platforms that 
carve out spaces which can contribute to 
better journalism and, ultimately, better 
local and national governance. This report 
explores, in the context of this environ-
ment, the challenges that these platforms 
face. It examines a number of barriers to 
the development of independent media in 
Iraq, providing some recommendations as 
to how these obstacles might be tackled. 
Based on interviews with key media and 
political stakeholders in early 2019, it 
provides some insight into the complex 
interaction between political and social 
conditions, structure and agency in Iraq. 
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Executive Summary and Recommendations
This policy report seeks to unravel the challenges faced by, and barriers to, independent 
media in Iraq. Based on key stakeholder interviews and ongoing work with media outlets 
in Iraq, it demonstrates that a number of fundamental structural challenges to the growth 
of independent media on a global level, combined with a very fragile post-conflict context 
and a lack of credibility on the part of Iraqi media, are stifling the landscape and ability 
of independent media to thrive. The historical context of the country’s media, and the 
particular journalistic practice that became endemic under the Baʿathist regime, is still 
defining and guiding the development of the media landscape and there remains a lack 
of will at a political level to address the situation. Public institutions continually fail to 
provide the necessary grounds from which to build a healthy media environment.
Within the scope of these barriers to independent media in Iraq, a number of 
recommendations are outlined for consideration:
1. Further legislative work and reform is imperative in order to create enabling circum-
stances within which independent media can perform. A greater focus is needed on 
enabling more independent media regulation as well as encouraging self-regulatory 
practice among media professionals and journalists, simplifying access to information 
processes, protection of sources, and transparency of media ownership and financing.
2. While the last few years have seen a number of projects aimed at transforming news 
media, the teaching of journalism has been largely disregarded, with few projects fo-
cusing on improving the quality of media studies programmes. If journalism is to play 
an important role in Iraq, aiding in the development of democratic practice, more 
support needs to be given to further and higher education institutions. Greater con-
sideration also needs to be given to the lack of employment opportunities for media 
students. The absence of teaching on new media, a shortcoming which is exacerbated 
by the conservative nature of many university faculties, reflects the need to modify 
curricula to address the rapid social transformation seen by the industry.
3. Greater provision for innovative content and business models will create an ecosys-
tem in which independent media could grow. Business models which focus on local 
and community media types are leading the way in some Global South countries. 
Content-sharing is also slowly becoming recognised amongst independent media as a 
means of developing a larger repository of diverse and distinct output. Content-shar-
ing can provide opportunities to grow audience share and break down echo chambers 
and confirmation bias in Iraq’s polarised media landscape.
4. Iraqi media stakeholders need to recognise that their plight is not unique; that many 
of the challenges they face are common in the Global South. If the Iraqi media begin 
to take part in existing international initiatives to develop new business models for 
sustainable media,  and define the role of journalism in a rapidly transformative age, 
they can benefit from a greater agency in their profession. Working in close partner-
ship with international networks and organisations would be the first step to ensuring 
deeper engagement with the global media and communities concerned with freedom 
of expression across the world.
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Scope and Objectives of the Research 
The importance of independent and diverse media is universally regarded as a key 
component of a democratic society. The ideal-type media’s role is to ensure a diverse and 
critical mix of news and information, free from bias or interference.1 This in turn creates 
a better-informed public. It is viewed as part of the democratic state’s responsibility to 
enable an environment where independent media of trusted and varied sources can 
compete in terms of quality and coverage. Successful media governance and organisations 
are considered key stimuli for democratic participation. This paper takes its definition 
of independent media to denote any public service, private or community media that 
‘works largely in the public interest and is reasonably free of influence from government, 
political, commercial, factional or other interests.’2
This paper was borne out of a notion of understanding ‘civicness’ in the media and an 
attempt to map examples of media platforms which are contributing to better governance 
in Iraq.3 It had hoped to focus on the positive in an arena defined by the negative, exploring 
opportunities where Iraqis were carving out spaces that could contribute to better 
journalism and, ultimately, better local and national governance. A normative concept 
of civic media in Iraq was defined using the following criteria which were selected based 
upon the notion of public interest and the function of the media in supporting the public 
to fully participate in political processes.4
• Exposing corruption
• Focusing on diversity and giving voice to unheard groups
• Providing success stories in the vein of positive journalism or solutions journalism
• Impacting on public opinion
• Remaining financially independent
• Promoting the public interest rather than the ‘national interest’
• Adhering to ethical journalistic practice/professional norms
Following a fieldtrip to Iraq and a series of interviews with journalists, editors and media 
owners, it became evident that this concept of civic media was too normative and, in fact, 
highly problematic in this context. Interviews, and in some cases participant observation, 
1   For further information, see Nick Couldry, Mirca Madianou and Amit Pinchevski, eds, Ethics of Media 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
2   James Deane, ‘The role of the independent media in curbing corruption in fragile settings’, Policy 
Briefing 16, BBC Media Action (September 2016). Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/
policybriefing/curbing-corruption-in-fragile-settings-report.pdf
3   The LSE Conflict Research Programme aims to use the concept of civicness to examine the constitution 
of humane forms of public authority in extreme circumstance. Further information available at: http://
www.lse.ac.uk/international-development/conflict-and-civil-society/conflict-research-programme/
about-us
4   The Ethical Journalism Network defines and lays out indicators for the notion of public interest in 
journalism, available at: https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/the-public-interest
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demonstrated that even in the case where media might be developing content that deals 
with key social and political issues in an accurate, fair and transparent way, there remained 
a number of significant impediments to independence and civicness. These serve to both 
inhibit the development of an independent media scene in Iraq and impact on the delivery 
of sustainable independent media content. This research was therefore repositioned in 
order to explore the barriers to the development of Iraq’s independent media.
Using three key paradigms to understand the media – political economy, sociology of 
news and Bourdieu’s concepts of doxa and habitus – this paper will now seek to address 
the ongoing challenges that the Iraqi media is facing and unravel the key factors that are 
contributing to its failure to provide new and improved spaces for debate. These paradigms 
formed the basis of interview questions and served to provide structure and focus for 
the research analysis. Political economy of the media allows for a more macro-level 
analysis of the landscape by looking at the structural constituents of power in the media 
industry, from funding to regulation to political control, as well as an understanding of 
the impact of the media on political engagement by the public.5 A more ‘critical approach’ 
to political economy will allow a deeper understanding of how meaning is constructed 
through other modes of power.6 Introducing sociological approaches to understanding 
the media provides a greater understanding of newsroom processes and the agency of 
the journalists involved in these processes7 while Bourdieu’s theories of doxa and habitus 
allow for a deeper engagement with the nature of journalistic practice and the conditions 
from which journalists emerge and within which they are operating.8 This triangulation of 
approaches will provide a deeper understanding of the challenges for independent media 
and journalistic practice in Iraq.
5   Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, ‘Manufacturing consent: A propaganda model’, Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York, Pantheon Books, 1988); Francesco Sobbrio, 
‘The political economy of news media: Theory, evidence and open issues’, in Francesco Forte, Ram 
Mudambi and Pietro Maria Navarra, eds, A Handbook of Alternative Theories of Public Economics 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2014), p. 278; Jonathan Hardy, Critical Political Economy of the Media: An 
Introduction (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
6   Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, ‘Culture, communications and political economy’, Mass Media 
and Society 3 (2000), pp. 70–92.
7   Michael Schudson, ‘The sociology of news production’, Media, Culture & Society 11.3 (1989), pp. 
263–82; Michael L. Tushman and Ralph Katz, ‘External communication and project performance: An 
investigation into the role of gatekeepers’, Management Science 26.11 (1980), pp. 1071–85.
8   P. Bourdieu and L. J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992); P. 
Bourdieu, ‘The political field, the social science field, and the journalistic field’ in R. Benson & E. Neveu, 
eds, Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 29–47.
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Method
This research is guided by fieldwork that took place in Iraq in January and February 2019. 
This comprised a number of structured and semi-structured interviews with previously 
identified news media stakeholders. The focus was on journalists and media practitioners 
whose journalistic output was predominantly produced for non-mainstream media, 
in order to understand what role new voices and smaller platforms are playing in the 
information sphere in Iraq. Interviews with the proprietors and editors of private media 
platforms which were not directly linked to political parties or partisan financing also took 
place. Three local media outlets were also interviewed as well as six journalists who were 
producing investigative work aiming to expose high level corruption and tackle issues 
of post-conflict integration and reconciliation. In some cases, participant observation in 
newsrooms in Baghdad during this fieldwork period also informed the analysis. A focus 
group was also conducted at Baghdad University Media School with undergraduate and 
postgraduate media students.
This paper draws upon a number of studies and conceptual frameworks used to understand 
independent media, particularly in conflict and post-conflict countries.9 The research 
also draws upon the researcher’s previous experience of working with Iraqi media and on 
media development projects in Iraq as well as an understanding of the types of content 
which resonate with audiences in Iraq, based on previous research and analysis.
The Global Challenges to the Information Sphere
This research took place at a time when the media is facing a crisis of purpose on a global 
scale and the Iraqi media is also plagued by issues that are resonating across the industry 
as a whole. There have been multiple shifts in the dynamics of the information sphere in 
the last few years. Advances in technology, increased access to the internet and mobile 
telecoms have seen the rudiments of journalism and the media challenged and transformed. 
Who and what makes journalism is being questioned with new spaces for dialogue and 
content emerging with increasing regularity. On the one hand, this has enhanced access 
to information, with an increase in diversity and communication made available to the 
public. On the other hand, the growth of online media has also been one of the chief 
instigators of disinformation, misinformation and hate speech. With technology and the 
increased influence of digital media on journalism and the industry’s business models, 
questions of media financing and the growth of media capture as a phenomenon are at 
the fore.10 A recent report by the Reuters Institute for Journalism recognised the growing 
9   Most notably, these are: James Putzel and Joost Van der Zwan, ‘Why templates for media development 
do not work in crisis states: Defining and understanding media development strategies in post-war 
and crisis states’, (2006); Deane, ‘The role of the independent media in curbing corruption in fragile 
settings’.
10   ‘Media capture’ refers to surreptitious forms of control over the media that impact upon conditions 
for democracy, pluralism and media freedom. See Anya Schiffrin, ed., In the Service of Power: Media 
Capture and the Threat to Democracy (Washington, DC: Center for International Media Assistance, 2017).
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susceptibility of the media to political and commercial influence globally as funding for 
it, and for the news in particular, becomes less secure.11 The financial sustainability of 
independent media and news platforms is also under severe threat, with the future of 
journalism unclear as traditional forms of independent revenue in the form of advertising 
and circulation become fluid.12
At the same time, the mainstream media is viewed by many identity groups to have failed 
by denying them spaces for self-expression and interaction. Media, often weakened by 
problems of restructuring of the media market and political pressures, have also been 
failing to provide a clear and accurate narrative to counteract the growth of widespread 
fake news and disinformation campaigns and a surge in online hate speech, both of which 
threaten the principles of democratic society and pluralism. In a global information 
environment, these add further to the problems of media and journalism in the Global 
South, particularly where political, economic and social crises are present. The 2019 
Edelman Trust Barometer shows media to be ‘the least trusted institution in the world’. 
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) recently established the Journalism Trust Initiative 
(JTI) in response to the concern that a decline in trust in journalism is ultimately leading 
to a decline in safety and security for journalists.13 The JTI aims to support the ability of 
media platforms to provide ‘transparency, verification and correction methods’ as well as 
‘editorial independence and compliance’.14
This decline in trust has been further exacerbated by the rise of digital and social media 
in particular. Social media giants have failed to address the crisis of falling public trust 
and are seemingly reluctant to recognise and give support to the need for reliable and 
ethical information streams. They have been unsuccessful in filling the gaps left by news 
providers and journalists. Recent developments have exposed key players such as Face-
book and its contemporaries as unethical and prone to corrupt practices, putting their 
users and the public at risk. While this should have resulted in growing awareness of the 
importance of professional journalism, it has actually meant that the public are turning to 
alternative sources of information which are free and delivered by platform aggregators 
such as Google.
11   Rasmus Kleis Nielsen and Meera Selva, ‘More Important, But Less Robust? Five Things Everybody 
Needs to know about the Future of Journalism’, Reuters Institute of Journalism (2019). Available at: 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-01/Nielsen_and_Selva_FINAL_0.pdf
12   The UK’s Cairncross Review report is available online at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.
uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/779882/021919_DCMS_Cairncross_
Review_.pdf
13   The RSF annual barometer to measure media freedoms on a country by country basis has seen an 
increase in violence and fear amongst journalists in 2019 and the number of countries where the media 
work freely on the decline once again. Further information available at: https://rsf.org/en/2019-world-
press-freedom-index-cycle-fear
14   Further information on the JTI is available at: https://rsf.org/en/news/more-100-media-outlets-and-
organizations-are-backing-journalism-trust-initiative
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The Iraqi Media Landscape: Historic and Current
The relationship between media and governance in Iraq has always been ambiguous. In 
a country where state interest has always been the dominant political force, the public 
information sphere has been owned or, at best, defined by the state and its associates. In 
post-colonial Iraq, an initial diversity and non-state ownership of the media was curtailed 
by overt external control which reduced the opportunity for a democratic public sphere 
to exist. Mainstream media ownership was almost entirely controlled by the government 
or party of the time. Newspapers existed as propaganda vehicles for their proprietors: 
Al Qadisya for the military, Al Thawra for the Baʿath party and El Taakhi for the Kurdish 
Democratic Party. By the late 1970s, and with a further clampdown on the media by the 
Baʿathist regime under Saddam Hussain, a landscape where party propaganda dominated 
and oppositional voices were silenced was established. Journalism was neither challenging 
the state’s authority and position nor providing citizens with the information they needed 
to participate in political processes. Iraqi audiences continued to consume news and 
content that was manipulated and controlled by the Baʿathist regime.
After the 2003 Iraq war and the Baʿathist regime’s fall, a project to support the growth 
of a more diverse and pluralistic media landscape was implemented by the Coalition 
Provision Authority (CPA). CPA orders 65 and 66 created a public service broadcaster, the 
Iraqi Media Network (IMN) and independent media regulator, the Communications and 
Media Commission (CMC). A lack of consideration of historical and political context, 
as well as very little consultation with media development experts, contributed to the 
creation of a landscape which allowed partisan media financed by political parties 
and businessmen to flourish.15 Private broadcast media in particular was financed by 
individuals and, although attempts to strengthen public media institutions such as the 
public broadcaster took place, public media institutions and related ministries remained 
highly politicised and were guided by the muhasasa system, remaining so to this day.16 
The CPA’s focus on facilitating private ownership in the media, in an attempt to support 
diversity, was usurped by their lack of concern for proper and nuanced regulation of the 
media that would support Iraq’s diverse and minority groups as well as provide a solid 
platform from which political plurality can build. It is also worth noting that, at this point 
in time, donor engagement in Iraq grew in significance and a number of donor-funded 
projects to strengthen democratic values and independent media were implemented.
The sectarian conflict that became more heightened after 2005 saw conditions become 
much harsher for the media. Distribution of newspapers became impossible in certain 
areas, with media associated with the dominant Shiʿa narrative banned from Sunni 
districts and vice versa. This also resulted in broadcast media only having access to 
interviews in affiliated areas, meaning audiences had little access to diverse views and 
15   Abir Awad and Tim Eaton, ‘The media of Iraq ten years on’, The Problems, the Progress (2013). 
Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/policybriefing/bbc_media_action_media_iraq_
ten_years_on.pdf
16   The muhasasa system is Iraq’s political quota system based on ethno-sectarian apportionment of 
ministries and public institutions.
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opinions. Al Sharqiya could only go to Adhamiya to report the news; Al Iraqiya to Karada, 
for example. Many journalists were not by-lined for fears over safety and reprisal. Many 
media operations relocated from Baghdad to Erbil and it was at this point that political 
parties began to interfere more directly in the media and offer financing.17
Today, despite a number of attempts to develop an independent public sphere, the Iraqi 
media landscape reflects some of the key issues and challenges that plague the political 
landscape. Corruption, politicisation and a growing lack of trust in official institutions afflict 
the media industry across the board.18 The media remain subject to growing constraints 
on media freedoms, in particular in relation to exposing corruption, and the threat from 
paramilitary actors is omnipresent.19 It becomes challenging therefore for the media to 
fully contribute to better governance, to foster an environment receptive to plurality of 
opinion or, indeed, to challenge power and authority in Iraq. The majority of attempts at 
developing financially and editorially independent media institutions have floundered, 
as the sources of funding remain linked to political, commercial or donor agendas. How 
effective these platforms can be in mediating between public officials and audiences or 
contributing to democratic transition and a post-conflict society remains unclear.
Media in a Fragile Post-Conflict Context
A survey conducted by BBC Media Action in May 2018 looked at media consumption habits 
in four provinces in Iraq: Baghdad, Anbar, Ninewa and Salahuddin. Its key findings are that 
social media is widely popular in Iraq, with 44 percent claiming they access the internet 
on either their computer, laptop, tablet or smartphone daily. Television is still, however, 
the most consumed media platform with 56 percent saying that television is their main 
medium for breaking news. The survey also analysed levels of trust in the media, focusing 
in the main on pan-Arab channels such as Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, national and local 
television and radio broadcasters as well as the Facebook pages of government and key 
institutions. It revealed declining trust in channels and pages associated with the ethno-
sectarian narratives that were widely prevalent between 2005–14.20 The negative impact of 
political ownership of the mainstream media and the subsequent ethno-sectarianisation 
of media outputs on levels of public trust in the media in Iraq is readily apparent.
The increased consumption of social media and digital news in Iraq is a cause of concern 
amongst media professionals in Iraq and is impacting upon their professional capacity. 
For economic reasons, websites are becoming the main platforms of news for many 
17   Meetings Baghdad January and February 2019.
18   See Transparency International’s definition of corruption and Corruption Index, available at: https://
www.transparency.org/cpi2018
19   For further information regarding attacks on journalists and specific case studies, see the websites of 
the Gulf Centre for Human Rights and Committee to Protect Journalists online at: https://www.gc4hr.
org/country/index/country/8 and https://cpj.org/mideast/iraq/
20   ‘Iraq media consumption survey report’, BBC Media Action, May 2018. 
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organisations but they struggle to compete with platform and technology giants. As social 
media continues to play a leading role in providing news, smaller privately funded media 
are focusing on more feature-led or story-based content, making them less likely to gain 
large or regular audiences. Journalists talked of salaries being commensurate with social 
media presence, forcing them to develop social media profiles and content, meaning they 
are less able to focus on journalism. Media platforms also discussed using Facebook as a 
recruitment tool for potential journalists.21 With a lack of proper training, this often results 
in journalism which is not fact-based, as new recruits are operating with little professional 
background or skills.
Global trends are clearly influencing the media landscape in Iraq and impacting on the 
ability of independent media to perform effectively. They are further complicated by the 
fact that Iraq is a fragile post-conflict state continuing to be plagued by both economic 
and political instability.22 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) notes that ‘a fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry out basic governance 
functions, and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society.’23 
Corruption is endemic in Iraq, further emboldened by networks of power based on 
lineage, nepotism and identity politics. This has led to increased radicalisation, both 
politically and at a grassroots level, as well as public disenfranchisement from institutions 
and authority. Media institutions are subject to these similar conditions of corruption and 
as such continue to be vulnerable to media capture and political co-option by a myriad of 
political and commercial actors. Media co-option by political and larger corporate actors 
further squeezes smaller media outlets, with the landscape increasingly dominated by a 
limited number of powerful players. Revenue from advertising and commercial projects 
are almost absent with the majority of funding coming from mobile operators, regulated 
by the CMC, a constitutional body subject to the machinations of the muhasasa system, 
or from government-controlled public advertising. These revenue sources are used to 
control opposition and anti-state narratives, a practice particularly prevalent under the 
former government of Nouri Al Maliki.24 Within this environment, there remains little 
inherent desire amongst the establishment to support independence or professionalisation 
in journalism for fear that their corrupt practices might be uncovered and exposed. 
Without any political will for the reform of media systems, there is very little chance 
for meaningful and lasting change or the development of alternative independent media 
platforms. Limited funding opportunities means that costlier forms of journalism, such as 
investigative reporting, are less likely to be supported.
21   Meetings in Baghdad, January and February 2019. 
22   Further information is available on Iraq from the Fragile States Index, at: https://fragilestatesindex.
org/country-data/; see also Renad Mansour, ‘Iraq’s 2018 Government Formation: Unpacking the Friction 
Between Reform and the Status Quo’, LSE Conflict Research Programme (2019). Available at: http://
eprints.lse.ac.uk/100099/1/Mansour_Iraq_s_2018_government_formation_2019.pdf
23   OECD, ‘Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World’, OECD Development 
Co-operation Directorate (DCD) International Network on Conflict and Fragility (2012). Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/development/resourceflowstofragilestates.htm
24   Meetings in Baghdad, January and February 2019. 
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As with the majority of fragile post-conflict states, the legal and regulatory frameworks that 
guide the media in Iraq currently offer very little in the way of supporting independent 
media.25 Media regulation and licensing has unsuccessfully taken into account spectrum 
and broadcasting allocations according to representation and the needs of Iraq’s many 
minority groups and sectors, fuelling a landscape of partisan media ownership. This is 
something that needs to be redressed. In the United Kingdom, for example, OFCOM’s 
licensing system has been developed to consider the wider social benefits of each license 
application, incentivising applicants either financially or with higher value broadcasting 
spectrum based on their contribution to a representative and diverse media ecology. 
There are also very little financial or spectrum concessions or government subsidies made 
available in order to encourage the growth of a diverse independent media landscape.
Underpinning this landscape lies a weak economy with little opportunity for economic 
growth or business development. As stated previously, the very limited external income for 
the media comes from advertising revenue with the remainder derived from political and 
government subsidies and, increasingly, international donors.26 Issues with over-reliance 
on donor funding for independent media range from a lack of sustainability and long-term 
security for media platforms to over-adherence to donor agendas. Media platforms in Iraq 
that receive funding from international donors are often obliged to focus their efforts on 
providing training and capacity building or monitoring media and human rights violations 
rather than content creation and production.27
Who are the Journalists?
As a result of these historical and structural conditions of the media, journalism is perceived 
as a less than desirable profession in Iraq. Low wages, a lack of long-term security and a 
lingering distrust of journalism which stems from political control of the media mean 
that younger generations are less inclined towards pursuing a career in the media. Saba 
Bebawi, references the ‘culture of journalism’ in the MENA region and the need to define 
‘professional identities’ which reflect the media context.28 In Iraq, this culture manifests 
itself with a small elite of journalists who have been attempting to develop independent 
platforms and spaces for free expression for nearly twenty years. Many of the members 
of this network have learned their skills through donor-funded projects and training and 
they continue to dominate the ‘alternative’ media scene, meaning new and diverse young 
voices remain unheard.
The fragile status of civil society and academia is also having a negative effect on the media 
industry’s ability to create and support an environment which can deliver independent 
programming and content. Media schools and colleges are operating in isolation from the 
25   Deane, ‘The role of the independent media in curbing corruption in fragile settings’.
26   Mary Meyers and Linet Angaya Juma, ‘Defending Independent Media: A Comprehensive Analysis of 
Aid Flows’, Centre for International Media Assistance (CIMA) (June 2018). Available at: https://www.
cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/CIMA-AidData-Report_web_150ppi_rev.pdf
27   Meetings in Baghdad, January and February 2019.
28   Saba Bebawi, Investigative Journalism in the Arab World: Issues and Challenges (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015).
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media industry itself and courses aimed at developing journalism skills and professionalism 
are rarely underpinned by real world expertise. This rift between academia and journalism 
is nothing unique, but in Iraq it is exasperated by an academic curriculum that has not 
been updated since the 1980s and limited opportunity for internships and on-the-job 
training. Media and journalism modules are often combined with public affairs and public 
relations training. This lack of coordination between the academic and practitioner worlds 
also means that curriculum is lacking other industry-relevant skills such as financial and 
business management. Iraq’s archaic education system, which sees students placed in 
colleges according to the grades they achieve, places media schools and colleges very 
low down the pecking order. The higher education system in Iraq is one that is based on 
a combination of merit and nepotism. Rather than choosing a preferred subject of study 
before attending university, students are allocated places on specific courses according 
to their overall mark when they graduate from secondary school. Those with the highest 
grades study medicine and law, followed by engineering and the sciences, with languages 
and media languishing behind. To enter media college or study media at university requires 
fairly average grades of between 70 and 80 percent. It is rare that a person acheiving grades 
above 80 percent will actually study media at university. There are, however, also a limited 
number of places on courses. It is not unknown for those without government or senior 
connections to lose their opportunity for a place on a course so that a diplomat or senior 
government official’s son or daughter can take it. Corruption and nepotism remain rife in 
the allocation of university places. Media practitioners complained about the quality of 
education that young media students are receiving, claiming that many fresh graduates 
lack the basic writing skills required for journalism.29
As a result, the skills and will required to develop strong independent media platforms 
in Iraq do not currently exist on a wide scale. Basic professional principles of accuracy, 
transparency and impartiality are compromised by a lack of understanding of what it 
means to be a journalist and provide content that will ultimately serve the public interest. 
Conclusion
Fundamentally, this paper argues that the lack of political will combined with the failure 
of state-building processes to develop the frameworks and institutions to support 
independent media is maintaining a media landscape that reflects the key political 
challenges of Iraq. The politics of successive Iraqi governments continues to affect the 
functioning and the perception of the media, leaving them unable to provide content that 
can support democratic and transparent political processes. Attempts at media reform or 
support for sustainable, relevant, independent media platforms must take into account 
the wider context of Iraq and its political structures as well as the existing conditions of 
corruption and fragility. They also require much deeper consultation with local media 
stakeholders combined with a greater coordination with global initiatives to support the 
development of independent media.
29   Meetings Baghdad, January and February 2019.
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